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At the center of Paul Moser’s ambitious new book is both a desire to get 
individuals in communion with the divine and a—well, the—prescription 
for how to do so. The desire is not what sets the work apart from a large seg-
ment of twentieth-century Christian theistic writers, but Moser’s develop-
ment of the ethics for the inquiry necessary to have individual communion 
with God is unique, and worthy of exploration by philosophers of religion. 
The result of Moser’s ethics is, what he calls, “relationship theism,” or a 
point of departure from which the human seeks to willingly be convicted by 
God to seek out his perfect redemption by participating in “an interpersonal 
relationship—the God relationship” (55).
The progression towards the ethics of inquiry required for relationship 
theism grows out of Moser’s conception of faith and into a defense of the 
existence and nature of God. If faith in God is a key object of inquiry, Moser 
suggests in chapter 1 that we need clarity of what “God” means. When 
Lewis Carroll quipped about the Snatch, “They sought it with thimbles, they 
sought it with care; They pursued it with forks and hope; They threatened its 
life with a railway-share; They charmed it with smiles and soap,” Moser thinks 
Carroll allegorically depicts the vagueness with which people refer to the 
divine today. “God” is a title attributable to perfection, and so requires an 
invocation of worship. As it turns out, the use of “perfection” for Moser 
is metaphysically and morally thick. If God is real (and, the book builds 
towards the conclusion that we ought to seek an experience of God’s re-
ality in our own lives), then the perfection of God contains a rich set of 
predicates, including that: God is sui generis in moral character (9, 13), 
God wants inquirers to know that God is perfect (9), God is morally per-
fect self-sufficiently (12), God requires imitatio Dei of humans who want a 
koinonia relationship with God (9), God is a personal agent (118–119), God 
has definite purposes in supplying evidence of divine reality to humans 
and self-authenticates to humans (10) but is not required to self-authen-
ticate to all humans at any particular time (13), God is worthy of worship 
(11), God is praiseworthy (29), and God is supremely authoritative over 
all things (75). As an intellectual enterprise, projects like theodicy fail to 
demonstrate God’s reasons for allowing evil in the world because they 
cannot encapsulate who God fully is. We are limited in our ability to think 
about divine perfection, and so are already unable to understand God’s 
reasons for what happens in creation. But, far from being a constraint, our 
limitations create space for an encounter with God to “seek interpersonal 




relationships of cooperative mutuality or reciprocity, including relation-
ships of freely-given agape between God and humans” (17). Humans are 
called to be open and vulnerable to a God-seeking relationship, which re-
quires more than a philosophical “ethics of belief” (in the vein of William 
James and W. K. Clifford)—it requires an ethics of inquiry.
Chapter 2 develops the “kind of mutuality and underlying experience” 
that biblical faith (i.e., the type Moser thinks supports relational theism) 
exemplifies (45). “Mutuality” here is exactly as we would expect: humans 
are willing to respond “to an intervention of God in one’s awareness or 
experience” (71) by entrusting the self to God, and God initiates personal 
interaction with humans in order to correct actions, thoughts, and feelings 
and to redeem the lives of those who have relational faith in God. The rela-
tionship envisioned by Moser includes traditionally-conceived notions of 
Christian hope and agape love, but he is clear that the cost of the relation-
ship for humans is high, and a necessary condition for it is struggle. “The 
resolve in question,” he writes, “requires human willingness to die to the 
authority of all powers in conflict with God and God’s power, for the sake 
of living for just one ultimate personal Power” (75). Each believer who 
aspires to relational theism sacrifices self-agency for a koinonia relation-
ship. (Moser uses koinonia from the onset of the book, but never defines it. 
Although he sets aside common definitions for some terms—“faith” for 
example—for other terms, he invokes them and expects that the reader 
knows what he means. By koinonia, Moser simply means “communion” 
or fellowship.) When the believer faces her own kenotic moment of self-
sacrifice, Moser explains that she has a Christ-like “Gethsemane weak-
ness of yielding one’s own will to God’s perfect will, even in the face of 
death” (77). Any who aspires to relational theism must have their own 
Gethsemane moment, to face a trial with God. The trial proves God’s moral 
character to the person and tests human moral character during obstacles 
(28). The trial is “testing for the reality of what God would value most 
in moral agents, including in God: their freely having enduring, faithful 
compassion toward other people for the sake of good, agape-oriented re-
lationships between those people, even when circumstances are difficult” 
(29). Faith that is produced from individual Gethsemanes can, over a life-
time, yield virtues that are indicative of having a relationship with God. 
Like Christ, each believer faces an individual trial which results in receiv-
ing compassion and redemption from God.
Of course, believers and non-believers alike go through trials without 
also understanding that the product of their suffering is divine compas-
sion in their lives. That, Moser contends in chapter 3, is because they do 
not have the proper ethical parameters in place to inquire about God. Any 
test of faith, or test of whether God is real in a person’s life, “would call for 
the ethics for inquiry about God, owing to the importance of responsible 
inquiry about God, all things considered” (116). Philosophers are at a dis-
advantage to establish the scope and content of this particular ethics of 
inquiry, because they rely on an argument-based mode of inquiry, rooted 
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in abstraction, which “can hinder illumination and decision-making re-
garding questions about God’s existence” (118). Being in a relationship 
with God is an existential state of being, rather than an epistemic one, so 
inquiries that begin with the question of God’s existence are faulty from 
the start. This type of ‘intellectualism’ equivocates between arguments 
and evidence, and fails to provide the “distinctive kind of evidence” a 
redemptive God would employ to reconcile humanity with God—espe-
cially evidence of perfect, redemptive love (120). Since God is not limited 
by evidence individuals already have (117), God can use resources be-
yond argumentation to become available to humans, and to personally offer 
redemption to each person (122). As an existential enterprise, the relevant 
ethics for inquiry calls for an inquirer to be in a responsible position to re-
ceive salient evidence of God’s reality and goodness. Given perfect divine 
goodness, we may expect such evidence to be available to humans under 
certain morally relevant conditions. God’s availability to humans does not 
entail that God be present at all times, to all people, in the same way, but 
Moser reminds his audience that the kenotic action of Christ proves God’s 
love to humans, shows what is best for all people, and prompts a recipro-
cating relationship with the divine (167). We should not be surprised that 
the divine hides, ducks and dives, and ultimately presents redemptive 
love to individuals in a manner which confounds philosophers.
If the ethics of inquiry requires God to show up to each individual, 
yet depends upon an experientially-available point of human departure 
wherein each person is open to seeing God’s reasons for suffering and 
grace, what is left is for the inquirer “to settle firsthand whether he or she is 
under divine inquiry, specifically regarding his or her own will relative to 
a morally perfect will” (192). In chapter 4, Moser suggests that answering 
a call to God’s will requires (what he calls) “evaluative wisdom” as well as 
“practical wisdom.” Evaluative wisdom helps the human agent prioritize 
among values, and practical wisdom is used to prioritize among actions 
(195). He rejects the “wisdom of the world,” or eloquent wisdom, which 
“points to human achievement in a way that would ignore or diminish the 
importance of what God has done for humans, particularly in Christ, the 
true wisdom of God” (204–205). Whereas eloquent wisdom depends upon 
intellectualism for its success to show what is valuable, generally mono-
theistic (but specifically Christian) evaluative wisdom helps the agent 
resist speculative arguments and bear witness to the redemptive power 
and wisdom of God. Where does the believer receive assurance of redemp-
tion and imputation of wisdom? From the Spirit. There is an “intersubjec-
tive pledge” that comes from the Spirit, which transcends the individual 
barriers of experience, background, and even a PhD. in philosophy that 
threaten our ability to know divine grace. “Divine assurance would come 
courtesy of God’s Spirit (that is, God self-manifesting and self-interpreting 
action),” Moser writes, “but not just as testimony. It would come by God’s 
‘pouring into our hearts,’ that is, our volitional centers as agents, the same 
love from God that was self-manifested in the crucified and risen Christ” 
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(211). What is felt by agents who receive this love then allows for cogni-
tive grace to take shape, “an epistemology of grace in divine salvation of 
humans” (211). The ethics of inquiry inspired by divine assurance results 
in certitude—an interpersonal affirmation from God, rather than epistemic 
certainty—which confirms that we have an irreducible first-person experi-
ence of the divine (230).
The critic might contend that we could never rightly suppose that there 
is a divine will, or to suspect that God’s will is directed towards humanity 
in a way that is meaning-making for humans. It is true, Moser agrees, that 
our own “uncooperative attitudes” and lack of “sympathetic cooperation” 
with God’s will can make it seem as though God’s will is hidden (when 
it isn’t) or opaque (when it ought not to be). Chapter 5 provides Moser’s 
roadmap to those among us who are chronically lost to discover the divine 
purpose for redemption and to solve our inability to sympathetically coop-
erate with God’s will. An ethics of inquiry compels us to inquire responsibly 
about God, and to put ourselves in a position to receive salient evidence 
and meaning, which could mean that we have to be open to relinquish-
ing our own priorities (255). Responsible inquiry yields to the presenting 
evidence of God’s power and love in one’s life, rather than any need to have 
evidence. Presenting evidence demonstrates what God has done to trans-
form a believer’s life. And this is the crux of the God-relationship: beliefs 
do not transform lives, but relationships do. A relationship with God provides 
the experiencer with power and love that cannot be explained by a mere 
belief that God exists. That makes the experiencer a witness to divine love, 
and then her own life serves as a defense of faith in God, “an opportunity 
to witness similarly for the sake of a defense of faith in God, that is, a de-
fense of its veracity or its evidential groundedness regarding God’s actual 
involvement” (308). Theodicy as a philosophical exercise suffers for its 
commitment to abstract logical problems, but a “witness-based defense” 
can testify more strongly to the self-manifestation of God in human ex-
perience (309). Serving as witnesses to God’s power and presence in our 
individual lives places the question of God’s reality squarely at the feet of 
each person (331).
The book’s ambition is in part derived from its pursuit of attracting 
readership across disciplines and theological commitments. There is, in-
deed, content that any scholar who has considered theodicy, the nature 
of God, and the response to evil will find insightful and a platform for 
further dialogue. Towards that end, I offer a few small points to consider, 
with the caveat that the book raises many more. (Two parenthetical notes 
may interest readers, both of which surely are intentional, and are raised 
without comment. Moser does not invoke a pronoun for God in the book, 
even when quoting scripture. The second is, as I point out in the first sen-
tence of this review, Moser does not frame his view as an ethics for the 
inquiry of a relationship with the divine, but the ethics for inquiry.)
As for critical issues, the first is directed at the highly-individualistic 
ethics that is posited in the text. Moser, without equivocation, develops 
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an ethics that only requires the experiencer and God. He is clear about the 
individual nature of the ethics—he grounds it in Kierkegaard’s claim that 
the individual is the main point of the God relationship (8) and carries the 
tune throughout the book. There are several striking consequences of this 
view. Moser would have it that individuals come to faith in God, which re-
quires the ethics of inquiry coupled with the right vulnerability and open-
ness to the divine, but such individualism is discordant with the seeming 
brokenness of humanity. If those who have a need of faith are already 
immoral, without moral character, and broken, how are they, individually, 
to follow the ethics of inquiry to discover the divine? It seems much more 
likely that a collective group of individuals (a church?) would demon-
strate the love and power of God by meeting the needs of the community 
around it and thereby bring others into faith. Also, Moser’s commitment to 
individualism favors a very small segment of Christian theology after the 
twentieth century, and (despite Moser’s contentions otherwise) is wildly 
inconsistent with, for example, Judaism and other Christian traditions, in 
which corporate inquiry into the holy texts is much more valuable than an 
individual pursuit.
Ethicists will correctly identify logical problems with Moser’s ar-
gument about why moral predicates should pertain to God, “If God is 
praiseworthy, as many people hold, then God would make praiseworthy 
choices about divine conduct . . . and would deserve credit for choosing to 
be perfectly good, and this credit would acknowledge God’s free choice 
in favor of what is good in action” (29). Finally, Moser’s ethics of inquiry 
has an inescapable demandingness problem. The poor unbeliever! It isn’t 
enough to use “reason”—reason separates a person from the experiential 
love and power of God—to come to the divine, it isn’t enough to poke, 
and prod, and raise questions. Instead, they have to have a right belief 
(that God exists), from the right source (God choosing to show God to the 
individual), in the right relationship (reciprocally with God, because of 
the person of Jesus Christ, through the Spirit), through the right manner 
(morally, through the ethics of inquiry). That the inquirer needs to be in a 
responsible position to receive salient evidence of God’s goodness seems 
to have the odd result that relational theism demands a right relationship 
of the person most disadvantaged to pursue it—the seeking atheist.
